The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a multilateral development bank that was established in 2016 with the aim of financing infrastructure projects in Asia and promoting regional economic integration.
The idea for the AIIB was first proposed by China in 2013, as a response to what it saw as a lack of representation in existing international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China believed that these institutions were dominated by developed countries and did not adequately address the needs of developing countries, particularly in Asia.
To address this perceived imbalance, China initiated the creation of the AIIB, which would be open to all countries in the region and would prioritize funding for infrastructure projects. The bank was formally launched in January 2016 with 57 founding members, including many Asian countries, as well as Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
One of the main advantages of the AIIB’s creation is the increased availability of funding for infrastructure projects in Asia. The bank has a capital base of $100 billion, with over 90 percent of this contributed by Asian countries. This funding can be used for a variety of projects, including transport, energy, telecommunications, and water supply.
Another advantage of the AIIB is that it offers an alternative source of financing for developing countries in the region. In the past, many of these countries have relied on loans from Western-dominated institutions like the World Bank and IMF, which have been criticized for imposing strict conditions on borrowers and for promoting policies that prioritize the interests of developed countries. The AIIB, by contrast, has promised to be more flexible and to work closely with borrowers to ensure that projects are aligned with their development priorities.
AIIB creation is considered as a major power move. Its implications should be viewed through the prism of relationship between global finance and sovereign states. Moreover, power as a goal is prevalent and traditional in the strategic thinking in the policy of communities throughout East Asia[1].
China became powerful and this means it has the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others and implement its policy [Freeman 1997]. Chinese government showed its ability to marshal necessary resources to establish China-led international organization, which was its goal because Beijing doesn’t have enough influence in the World Bank, ADB and IMF.
According to the Comprehensive National Power (综合国力) indicator, used by the Chinese government, now China is the second strongest state in the world[2]. The creation of international financial organization has always been the hegemon’s prerogative. Thus, such China’s move reflects the tendency that global balance of power is changing not in favor of the USA.
Australian scientist and representative of the English School of International Relations Hedley Bull defined international order as ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary of primary goals of the society of states, or international society’ [Bull 1987]. Institutions change the global balance of power and, in turn, influence the international order. AIIB’s appearance increases China’s impact in Asia. Therefore, growing Chinese financial power is accepted as a challenge by current status quo powers as the USA and Japan – both don’t want to change the rules of the game in Asia at the moment.
Even if, from the Chinese point of view, it is supposed to be natural. Asian international order existed long time ago and was led by China. It’s obvious that Beijing has a strong sense of entitlement to be a regional leader again. It considers the contemporary Chinese presence in the international order, established after World War Two, as not adequate to current China’s elevated position in the global economy. [门洪华 2016].
The main consequences of the AIIB’s establishment for China are its increased international influence and progress in its efforts to manage domestic economic challenges. The USA and its Asian allies are disinclined to accept AIIB as one more additional puzzle to the global financial system alongside with other MDBs, that’s why they perceive it as a threat to their current geopolitical position. However, if there had been some attempts from the Obama administration to stop or slow down the establishment of the AIIB, they didn’t succeed and this was precisely articulated by Evan Feigenbaum, a former State Department official in the George W. Bush Administration: “The U.S. attempt to halt or marginalize the AIIB failed miserably”[3].
Additionally, it should be noted that AIIB’s creation led to one more economic implication – preparing grounds for possible future internationalization of Yuan[4].
China still is in the “dollar trap”: on the one hand, it has to continue buying the US Treasury securities because USD huge reserves accumulated by China are devaluating due to the quantitative easing monetary policy conducted by the Fed (The Federal Reserve System)[5]. A violent despeciation of the USD can lead to huge losses to China. On the other hand, at the moment China can’t borrow in its own currency, therefore, it is vulnerable to the balance of payment crises [Lai 2015]. Chinese currency internationalization may be a way to deal with those hurdles.
Firstly, internationalized Yuan should improve the globalization process and this intention was stated in the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). It will hasten the trade between China and the world, reduce transactions costs and risks of cross-border exchanges, settle payments, denominate financial assets and become the reserve currency for foreign central banks. Secondly, it will give China a seigniorage – the ability to issue Yuan to other countries in exchange for real goods and to lend Chinese currency abroad at low rates. The increased international demand for Yuan for trade invoicing and settlement will keep the interest rates low. Thirdly, once Yuan is internationalized, Chinese companies will be able to borrow internationally in their own currency – this will reduce the risk of businesses’ bankruptcy amid the possible sharp depreciation of Yuan [Huang and Lynch 2013].
The economic troubles and widespread bankruptcies in Asian countries during 1997-1998 Financial Crisis were mainly caused by the currency mismatch, when the companies were unable to cover their debts issued in foreign, not domestic, currency[6].
China has been already giving loans in Yuan and using its currency for the international trade settlements, for example, partly with Russia. Beijing would like other countries to peg their currencies to Yuan. However, China sees the Yuan internationalization as a long process according to Hu Xiaolian (胡晓炼) – the Chairman of Export-Import Bank of China[7]. She stressed that Chinese currency internationalization wouldn’t be a confrontation weapon.
Nowadays AIIB provides loans in the USD, but in the near future it may lend in Yuan as well – and this will come in accordance with the national economic development blueprint.
The creation of the AIIB reflects China’s growing economic and financial power, as well as its desire to increase its influence in Asia and on the global stage. This move challenges the current status quo powers, such as the USA and Japan, who are reluctant to accept the AIIB as a new addition to the global financial system. However, the establishment of the AIIB also has economic implications, as it may pave the way for the future internationalization of the Yuan. This could help China deal with its domestic economic challenges, such as the need to borrow in its own currency and reduce its vulnerability to balance of payment crises. The internationalization of the Yuan could also improve the globalization process, give China a seigniorage, and reduce the risk of businesses’ bankruptcy. Nevertheless, Chinese officials have emphasized that the Yuan internationalization is a long process and not intended as a confrontation weapon.
The AIIB represents an important development in the international financial landscape, providing much-needed funding for infrastructure projects in Asia and offering an alternative source of financing for developing countries in the region. While concerns about the bank’s governance and China’s influence remain, the AIIB has taken steps to address these issues and has the potential to play a positive role in promoting economic development and integration in Asia.
[1] Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2008, pp. 113-157
[2] 大国兴衰与中国机遇：国家综合国力评估， 海外生活，available at: https://m.juwai.com/news/225747
[3] Evan Feigenbaum, “China and the World,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2017
[4] Wang Da, “Chinese consideration and global significance of the AIIB”, Northeast Asia Forum, No. 03, 48–64, 2015
[5] Paul Krugman, “China’s Dollar Trap”, The New York Times, 2009, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/opinion/03krugman.html
[6] Peterson Institute for International Economics, available at: https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/373/2iie3608.pdf
[7] 进出口银行胡晓炼：不能把人民币国际化当成国际对抗的武器, available at: https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2021-06-11/doc-ikqcfnca0417359.shtml
